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I. Introduction 
 The pharmaceutical industry may have lost its ability to differentiate prescription drug 
tablets from generic imitations in light of the Third Circuit’s decision in Shire US Inc. v. Barr 
Laboratories Inc.1  Traditional trade dress jurisprudence has long recognized a cause of action 
whereby a national brand-name manufacturer can sue to protect its product’s identity from a 
generically manufactured facsimile.  Such an action normally arises when a generic 
manufacturer copies the appearance of a brand-name product, thereby gaining instant product 
recognition based on the brand-name manufacturer’s established marketing and accumulated 
goodwill.2  Trademark common law and the Lanham Act protect brand-name manufacturers 
from such unfair trade practices.3  Over-the-counter drugs are packaged in containers bearing 
manufacturers’ names and markings, enabling consumers to differentiate between, for example, 
Ecotrin™ aspirin and generic CVS store brand aspirin.4  When a generic manufacturer’s label is 
sufficiently similar to that of an established product, the Lanham Act dictates that the generic 
                                                          
1 Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 329 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2003). 
2 E.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765-68 (1992). 
3 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1999). 
4 Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex Prods. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
 manufacturer must cease selling its product.5  Even when products, i.e., tablets, are physically 
identical, packaging labels serve as sufficient identification of their source.   
 Prescription drugs manufacturers, however, do not enjoy the same array of product 
differentiating techniques, mostly because of the regulated manner in which prescription 
medications are dispensed.6  Unlike over-the-counter drugs, “[i]t is the physician, not the 
consumer, who selects the [prescription drug].  The drugs are repackaged by a pharmacist in 
clear vials which contain no easily identifiable designation of source, unique packaging or 
individual labeling trade dress to distinguish it.”7  Thus, trade dress, i.e., the size, shape and, 
color of the tablet itself, is the only indication of source available to a patient, who is the ultimate 
consumer of prescription medication. 
 After the Third Circuit’s decision in SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 
Inc., prescription drug companies clearly retained the capability to protect their drug tablet’s 
trade dress, i.e., the tablet’s color, size and shape.8  However, the court’s holding in Shire has 
potentially cracked the foundation of the prescription drug trade dress protection it set out in 
SK&F.9  Facing facts similar to those in SK&F, the Shire court decided to divest the brand-name 
manufacturer of all rights in its product’s trade dress, thereby opening the door for generic drug 
producers to trade on the reputation built by brand-name drug manufacturers.10  The remaining 
method of protecting prescription drug trade dress after Shire requires that companies 
extensively advertise their product.  As an unintended effect of the holding in Shire, brand-name 
drug companies must spend a great deal more on advertising costs than they otherwise would 
have, an increase that will only be passed off to consumers through raising drug prices. 
                                                          
5 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
6 See Smithkline Beckman Corp., 605 F. Supp. at 753. 
7 Id. 
8 SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980). 
9 Shire, 329 F.3d at 356. 
10 Id. 
  Part II of this Note will review the statutory purpose of the Lanham Act and discuss the 
application of trade dress protection under the Act.  Part III will consider the Third Circuit’s 
construction of trade dress law in the SK&F decision.  Finally, Part IV of this Note will address 
the questions raised by the holding in Shire US, Inc. v Barr Laboratories, Inc., namely: (1) 
whether prescription drug trade dress should be analyzed under traditional notions of trade dress 
law, and if not, (2) whether the Lanham Act is the appropriate vehicle for protecting a 
prescription drug tablet’s trade dress, or (3) in the alternative, whether prescription drug tablets 
should be analyzed under a modified trade dress framework.  Such an alternative will be 
proposed. 
II. The Lanham Act and Trade Dress Protection
 The Lanham Act was intended to make “actionable the deceptive and misleading use of 
marks” and to “protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition.”11  A 
trademark under the Act is defined as “any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination 
thereof . . . [used] to identify and distinguish . . . goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods . . . .”12  The Lanham Act 
does not require that the specific source of the product be identifiable from the trademark; rather, 
the trademark must simply enable a consumer to identify that the product came from a single 
source.13   
 In addition to protecting registered trademarks, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates a 
federal cause of action for trade dress infringement.14  The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
language of this section broadly, expanding the realm of protectable trade dress to anything 
                                                          
11 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999). 
12 Id. 
13 See id. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). 
 “human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ . . . that is capable of carrying meaning.”15  
Therefore, trade dress “involves the total image of a product and may include features such as 
size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”16   
 As the Court set out in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., for a product’s trade dress 
to fall within the purview of the Lanham Act’s protections, the producer must show: (1) that the 
trade dress is either inherently distinctive, or is said to be distinctive as a result of acquiring 
“secondary meaning;” (2) that there is a likelihood of consumer confusion; and (3) that the 
alleged infringing feature is nonfunctional.17
 A.  The Requirement of Distinctiveness
 In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., Judge Friendly introduced the four 
accepted classes of distinctiveness: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful.18  
Generic and descriptive marks cannot gain trademark protections because they merely refer to 
“the genus of which a particular product is a species.”19  Generally, they are the common names 
of products that convey “an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the 
goods.”20  Courts recognize an exception to this general rule, allowing merely descriptive marks 
to gain distinctiveness by acquiring secondary meaning.21  “To establish secondary meaning, a 
manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product 
feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.”22  Put 
slightly differently, a mark acquires secondary meaning when consumers can identify the source 
                                                          
15 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209-10 (citation omitted). 
16 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 n.1 (1992) (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clark 
Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
17 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210. 
18 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 11 (quoting Stix Prds., Inc. v. United Merchs. and Mfrs. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
21 Id. at 9. 
22 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 
U.S. 111, 118 (1938)). 
 of the product from the mark, alone.  The most common means of gaining secondary meaning is 
through extensive advertising, which creates an association between products and their 
respective marks.23   
 At the other end of the spectrum, suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful marks are inherently 
distinctive.  They are considered inherently distinctive because their “intrinsic nature serves to 
identify a particular source.”24  Kodak and Exxon are well-known examples of such marks.25  
Currently, these marks receive all of the rights allowed under the Lanham Act without a showing 
of secondary meaning, but this was not always so clear.26   Prior to 1992, the circuit courts were 
split regarding the applicability of this framework for classifying trademark distinctiveness to 
trade dress law.27  Whereas the Second Circuit consistently held that trade dress protection was 
unavailable absent proof of secondary meaning,28 in the Fifth Circuit, no showing of secondary 
meaning was required if a trade dress was considered inherently distinctive. 
 In the landmark case of Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme Court quelled 
this circuit split.29  The respondent sought protection of the décor of its Mexican themed 
restaurant under the Lanham Act’s trade dress law.30   Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Court 
held that if a product’s trade dress is inherently distinctive, it is capable of identifying the source 
of its product, thereby rendering unnecessary the requirement of establishing secondary 
meaning.31  The Court reasoned that if it interpreted § 43(a) as requiring secondary meaning, 
                                                          
23 Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978). 
24 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. 
25 Little Caesar Enters., Inc., v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1987).   
26 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11. 
27 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772-74. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 767. 
30 Id. at 765-66. 
31 Id. at 776. 
 then Congress’ purpose in promulgating the Lanham Act would be undermined.32  The stated 
purpose of the Lanham Act is to: 
secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to 
protect the ability of the consumers to distinguish among competing 
producers.  National protection of trademarks is desirable . . . because 
trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by 
securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.33
 
If it were more difficult to gain protection on inherently distinctive trade dress, competition 
between producers would be hindered because copycats could enter the market under the same 
trade dress, thereby nullifying the Lanham Act’s policies of ensuring quality and fostering 
competition.  Therefore, to comport with Congress’ intent, the Supreme Court construed § 
43(a)’s distinctiveness element as requiring a an initial inquiry into whether a product is 
inherently distinctive , allowing for the possibility that a product can receive protection even 
absent proof of secondary meaning.34  
 B.  Likelihood of Consumer Confusion
 Because a market economy requires competition to remain functional and healthy, it is 
permissible and desirable for a new business to produce products similar to ones already in 
existence.  However, the Lanham Act precludes the later-arriving producer from gaining its 
market share through the use of another manufacturer’s trade dress.  This restriction is premised 
on one of the Act’s underlying policies - alleviating consumer confusion.35   
 Prior to 2000, the Third Circuit analyzed “likelihood of confusion” differently depending 
upon whether the alleged trade dress infringer was dealing in competing or noncompeting 
                                                          
32 Id. at 774. 
33 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3-5 (1946)). 
34 Id. at 773.  
35 Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 goods.36  “Where the [trade dress] owner and the alleged infringer deal in competing goods . . . , 
the court need rarely look beyond the mark[s].”37  To determine the likelihood of confusion in 
noncompeting goods, however, the court has depended upon factors set out in Interpace Corp. v. 
Lapp, Inc.38  The Lapp factors include: 
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark [or trade dress] and the alleged 
infringing mark; 
 
(2) the strength of the owner’s mark; 
(3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of 
consumers when making a purchase; 
 
(4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion 
arising; 
 
(5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 
 
(6) the evidence of actual confusion; 
 
(7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the same channels of 
trade and advertised through the same media; 
 
(8) the extent to which the targets of the parties’ sales efforts are the same; 
 
(9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers, whether because of the near-
identity of the products, the similarity of function, or other factors; and  
 
(10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to 
manufacture a product in the defendant’s market, or that he is likely to expand into that 
market.39 
 
 In A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., the Third Circuit changed 
course, holding that the Lapp factors should be applied in all trade dress infringement actions, 
even in cases involving only non-competing goods.40  The court clarified its position by 
                                                          
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 E.g., A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Lapp, 721 
F.2d at 460-63). 
39 Lapp, 721 F.2d at 463. 
40 Victoria’s Secret, 237 F.3d at 214. 
 differentiating between the standard and the test of likelihood of confusion.  When dealing with 
competing goods, the standard, the similarity of the products takes on increased importance; 
because products in the former group are sold side-by-side, they are more likely to be confused if 
their trade dresses are similar.41  Though similarity may become the most important factor in 
determining whether competing goods are likely to be confused, it is not the only 
consideration.42  For support, the court pointed to the fact that the Lapp factors “considers the 
competitive and potential competition of the products in the market place.”43  As a result, the 
court held that the test for determining likelihood of confusion, i.e., the Lapp factors, would 
apply to both competing and non-competing goods in order to determine if the trade dress 
reaches the appropriate standard. 
C.  Functionality
 Even when a brand-name manufacturer can establish that its trade dress is distinctive and 
that there is no likelihood of consumer confusion, the allegedly infringing trade dress cannot be 
protected if it possesses a functional characteristic. 44  In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc., the United States Supreme Court recognized two tests for determining the 
functionality of trade dress.  Under the traditional test, “a product is functional . . . if it is 
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”45  
The second test classifies a product’s feature as functional if its “exclusive use . . . would put 
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”46  




44 Lanham Act § 43(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (1999) (“The person who asserts trade dress protection has the 
burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.”). 
45 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
46 Id. 
 The policies behind the functionality requirement are twofold.  The first is to ensure “that 
competition will not be stifled by the exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses.”47  
Requiring functionality recognizes the differences between trademark law and federal patent law.  
Whereas trademarks are given perpetual protection, protection is afforded to the functional 
components of a product for only a limited time under federal patent law, allowing competitors 
to freely use the functional components thereafter.48  Accordingly, by limiting protection to 
product features that are non-functional, trade dress law does not overstep its intended 
usefulness.  Additionally, functionality protects brand-name manufacturers from the copying of 
product-identifying features by generic manufacturers.49
III.   Prescription Pharmaceutical Tablet Trade Dress Protection in the Third Circuit 
after SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc.
  In SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., SK&F, Company (“SKF”), a 
brand-name prescription drug producer, manufactured an oral diuretic in hard gelatin capsules 
with a maroon and white color combination.50  After the expiration of the capsule’s patent, a 
generic prescription drug producer, Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. (“Premo”), 
manufactured an oral diuretic and adopted the same maroon and white color scheme as SKF’s 
product but with Premo’s logo stamped on the gelatin capsule.51  SKF filed a complaint 
consisting of several counts, including one for trade dress infringement in violation of § 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act.52  In granting SKF a preliminary injunction, the trial court relied on its findings 
that SKF had expended large amounts of money promoting its product’s trade dress, that doctors 
                                                          
47 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992). 
48 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
49 Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 2003). 
50 SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1057 (3d Cir. 1980). 
51 Id. at 1058. 
52 Id. 
 had prescribed the SKF product for 15 years to millions of patients, and that SKF’s was the only 
product in the diuretic market using the maroon and white color scheme.53
 On appeal to the Third Circuit, Premo reiterated several arguments in favor of permitting 
copying SKF’s trade dress.  First, Premo suggested that making generic products look like brand-
name counterparts was desirable “to facilitate identification of a particular medication of a 
particular strength . . . .”54  Next, Premo argued that the standardization of color, size, and shape 
is important to both ensure that the proper drug is dispensed and to assist in rapid identification 
of medications in emergency situations.55  Premo also predicted that physicians would be 
confused when trying to visually identify a prescription drug.56  Finally, Premo suggested that 
patients feel more confident taking a generic product when its chemical make-up is the same as 
that of its brand-name counterpart.57  
 The appellate court rejected these arguments in short order.  As to the assertions 
regarding identification of drugs, the court relied on testimony of physicians who stated that they 
would never rely upon trade dress as the sole means of identifying a prescription drug.58  The 
court rejected the argument that patients would lose confidence in generic drugs that don’t 
resemble brand-name counterparts because most states require that a patient be informed of a 
generic substitution.59  Moreover, the court reasoned that even if standardization of the color 
scheme for the purpose of easing patient anxiety was a viable argument, Premo’s generic drug 
was not composed of the same amount of each ingredient as SKF’s brand-name drug. 60  The 
                                                          
53 Id. at 1059. 
54 Id. at 1060. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1061. 
58 Id. at 1060. 
59 Id. at 1061. 
60 Id. 
 court determined that while the generic drug may be chemically similar to the brand-name drug, 
the variation in ingredients could lead to dangerously different reactions in a given patient.61
The Third Circuit relied on the traditional trade dress infringement analysis.  The court 
gave deference to the trial court’s finding that the trade dress was distinctive.62  In considering 
the likelihood of confusion, the court found that the products would confuse consumers because 
the tablets were colored similarly and the logos were so small that they were ineffective.63  
Finally, the court found that the color, shape, and size of the tablet were nonfunctional because 
“[t]he adoption of that trade dress was arbitrary, having nothing to do with the purpose or 
performance of the drug, or with its processing.”64  Having found all of the elements for the 
cause of action to be present, the court affirmed the lower court’s determination that Premo 
infringed SKF’s trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.65
 In SK&F, the Third Circuit broadly construed the Lanham Act, thereby granting 
prescription drugs a wide range of protection for the trade dress of their tablets.  In addition to 
the reasons stated herein, the court also likely considered that, unlike over-the-counter drugs, a 
prescription drug manufacturer relies on its product’s trade dress as the only visible, source-
identifying feature within its control.  Accordingly, the court found that prescription drug trade 
dress deserves heightened protection. 
IV.   The Third Circuit’s Change of Heart in Shire US Inc. v. Barr Laboratories Inc.
 In May 2003, the Third Circuit clouded the parameters of prescription drug trade dress 
protection when it handed down its decision in Shire US Inc. v. Barr Laboratories Inc.  The 
plaintiff in the case, Shire U.S., Inc. (“Shire”), manufactured the brand-name drug Adderall for 
                                                          
61 Id. at 1061, 1061 n.4. 
62 Id. at 1061. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1064. 
65 Id. at 1068. 
 the treatment of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).66  For years, Shire produced 
and sold its tablets in two colors, a blue 10mg tablet and an orange 20mg tablet, both stamped 
with an “AD” on one side and the dosage on the other.67  Shire promoted its product through 
literature, featuring colored pictures of the drug, which was distributed to physicians.68  
 Barr Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”), began selling a generic version of Adderall in 2002.69  It 
adopted a color scheme very similar to Shire’s, in which lower dosage tablets were blue and 
higher dosage tablets were orange.  Both were stamped with a “b” on one side and a serial 
number on the other.70  The trial court found that Shire’s Adderall and Barr’s generic product 
were of the same coloring and were “similar but not identical.”71  Further, the court considered 
Shire’s assertion that the ingredients of the generic substitute were not identical: Barr’s generic 
drug contained the inactive ingredient saccharin, a once controversial substance.72
 In denying Shire’s request for preliminary injunction, the Third Circuit attempted to 
distinguish its 1980 SK&F decision from the facts presented in Shire.  Ultimately, all of the 
methods employed by the court to do so failed.  First, the court asserted that the evidence in 
SK&F indicated that actual “passing off” had occurred within pharmacies.73  However, the 
SK&F court construed New Jersey common law, not the Lanham Act, in making its finding of 
passing off.74  Moreover, the court did not find that actual passing off had occurred in the earlier 
case, but rather that it could “reasonably anticipate” that passing off may occur.75  Thus, the 
                                                          
66 Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 349 (3d Cir. 2003). 
67 Id. at 350. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 351. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 350. 
73 Id. at 356 (citing SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980)).  Passing off is 
common law tort that involves fraudulently markets one’s goods as those of another.  SK&F, 625 F.2d at 1062. 
74 SK&F, 625 F.2d at 1062-65. 
75 Id. at 1062-63. 
 Shire court that passing off was a distinguishing factor was unpersuasive, as the court certainly 
could have “reasonably anticipated” that pharmacies may pass off the similarly colored tablets 
present in Shire. 
 Next, the court attempted to justify its departure from precedent by finding that the 
tablet’s trade dress in Shire was functional, while the SK&F court considered a non-functional 
product features.76  In so doing, the court considered, but failed to give sufficient weight to, the 
fact that the functionality arguments raised in Shire were very similar to those in SK&F.  In 
Shire, the evidence of functionality relied on by the court consisted of affidavits from physicians 
stating that generic manufacturers should be permitted to use similar color schemes to those of 
brand name tablets because color coding would lead to: (1) less patient confusion, (2) proper 
patient adjustment from one medicinal strength to another, (3) proper dosing for children whose 
medications are administered by non-medical personnel, and (4) increased acceptance and 
comfort for patients using generic medication.77  Although these assertions seem logical, they are 
the very arguments that the Third Circuit rejected as evidence of functionality in SK&F.78  
Instead of establishing a bright line rule for whether color, size, and shape of prescription tablets 
are functional elements of trade dress, the court merely deferred to the trial court’s finding of 
functionality.79
 So what changed in the twenty-three years after SK&F that caused the Third Circuit to 
restrict the trade dress protection that it had once afforded?  The likely answer is linked to the 
                                                          
76 Shire, 329 F.3d at 356. 
77 Id. at 354-55. 
78 See supra Part III. 
79 Shire, 329 F.3d at 356. 
 United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., which was 
handed down in 2000.80
 In Wal-Mart, Samara Brothers, Inc. (“Samara”), brought a trade dress infringement 
action against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”), for copying its line of children’s clothing 
designs.81  Samara asserted that its designs, including color scheme, geometric patterns, and 
symbols on the garments themselves, created a protectable trade dress under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.82  In finding that the clothing did not deserve protection, the Court held that “courts 
should err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design,” making 
it impossible for designs to be inherently distinctive.83  Thus, the designs could only gain trade 
dress protection by acquiring secondary meaning.84  The Court reasoned that a literal reading of 
the unrestrictive language of § 43 of the Lanham Act would entitle anything capable of carrying 
meaning to protection.85  To provide such broad protection would deprive consumers “of the 
benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design 
ordinarily serves by . . . [facilitating] plausible threats of suit against [competitors] based upon 
alleged inherent distinctiveness.”86  The Wal-Mart holding revealed the Supreme Court’s 
concern that the circuit courts had overly broadened trade dress protection in past years; this case 
reads like an attempt to constrict the protection before it extended too far out of control.87   
 In Shire, the Third Circuit refers to the Supreme Court’s desire to constrict trade dress 
protection.  The court stated, “[m]oreover, we have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s most 
                                                          
80 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
81 Id. at 207-08. 
82 Id. at 208. 
83 Id. at 215. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 210. 
86 Id. at 213. 
87 See id. at 209. 
 recent trade dress decisions which caution against the over-extension of trade dress protection.”88  
Accordingly, the Third Circuit turned away from the values it endorsed in SK&F, denying Shire 
the trade dress protection it would have previously received.  But even taking as true the courts’ 
premise that trade dress protection is over-extended, an unconsidered question remains: Should 
prescription pharmaceutical tablets seeking trade dress protection be subjected to the same 
analyses as traditional product design goods? 
V.   Prescription Pharmaceutical Tablets and Traditional Trade Dress Protection  
 As discussed above, Wal-Mart instructs the circuit courts to constrict the trade dress 
protection afforded to product design goods.89  The Supreme Court was primarily concerned with 
the effect that granting trade dress protection to designs of such products would have on 
competition.90  In determining that product design should never be inherently distinctive, the 
Court cited both the deterrent effect of a “plausible threat of [a] successful suit” involving an 
allegedly inherent design on hindrances to competition, and its finding that design could not 
likely inherently identify the source of a good.91  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that any 
inherently distinctive design could certainly obtain a design patent or be protected by copyright 
laws.92
 Likely underlying the court’s assertions was the knowledge that manufacturers of such 
products also had the ability to create source-identifying product packaging.93  Regrettably, the 
court’s premise fails when applied to the discreet class of prescription drug tablets.  The 
                                                          
88 Shire, 329 F.3d at 358. 
89 For an example of a court affording trade dress protection to a traditional product design due to its inherent 
distinctiveness, see Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Sangiacomo N. A., Ltd., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999) (protecting 
bedroom furniture). 
90 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213. 
91 Id. at 214. 
92 Id. 
93 For example, furniture may be shipped in boxes that carry the name and logo of its manufacturer, thereby 
identifying the source of the product.  See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 363. 
 producers of these products do not have the same source-identifying product packaging available 
to them as do other types of products.  The tablets are packaged in bottles capped with white lids.  
White labels on the side of the container indicate patient information, dosage, the prescribing 
doctor, and the type of drug.  These labels are provided by the pharmacist; the manufacturer has 
no control over the aesthetics of the labels.  Thus, the tablet design itself is the only real source-
identifying characteristic available to the manufacturer.  To take advantage of the protections 
granted to inherently distinctive trade dress, drug producers have accordingly developed unique 
color schemes, shapes, and sizes for their tablets. 
Under Shire, these unique tablet designs have lost any protection they may have 
possessed under trade dress law, absent a showing of secondary meaning.  While restricting trade 
dress protection of prescription drug tablets may seem to be justified in light of the large profits 
drug manufacturers amass through available patent protections, it will likely prove to be an 
inefficient means of curtailing a drug manufacturer’s protections.  Restriction could have a 
widespread and adverse financial impact on an already overpriced pharmaceutical market.  Shire 
and Wal-Mart effectively hold that the only way pharmaceutical companies can acquire trade 
dress protection for prescription drug tablets is to gain distinctiveness through secondary 
meaning.  Secondary meaning is primarily gained through expending millions of dollars on 
advertising in various media so that consumers will recognize the manufacturer as the source of 
the drug.94  Unintended though the result may be, pharmaceutical companies will be forced to 
increase their advertising budgets to obtain any degree of assurance of protection. 
It is reasonable to assume that at least a portion of any increase in the cost of production 
will in turn be assigned to the consuming public.  That the consumer class cannot afford to pay 
these continually rising and unnecessary advertising costs was made evident by recent events in 
                                                          
94 Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 Springfield, Massachusetts.  In order to take advantage of reduced cross-border prices, the city 
government struck a deal with Canadian drug producers whereby the city agreed to purchase its 
prescription drugs from the Canadian producers instead of American companies.95  This action 
not only eased the cost of health care but also relieved the city’s significant deficit.96  The border 
crossing of prescription drugs will continue to occur, as consumers will seek alternative sources 
of medication until the prices of prescription drugs in the United States are reduced.  Eliminating 
the requirement that drug manufacturers saturate the media with advertisements would be an 
obvious step toward easing prices. 
Significant financial cuts could also be achieved by granting protections to drug 
producers who direct their advertisements to medical practitioners, instead of consumers.  
Historically, prescription drugs were only advertised to the drug prescribers, since they alone 
decided which drugs were prescribed.97  As patients became more active in their own health care, 
pharmaceutical companies began to attempt to indirectly influence prescribers’ drug choices by 
mounting advertising campaigns that educated consumers about available pharmaceutical 
options.98  Since 2001, the pharmaceutical industry has increased its advertising directed at 
consumers to almost $2.5 billion, almost 200 times the amount spent on the same type of 
advertising in 1989. 99
While many commentators have attributed this increase in advertising to the Federal 
Drug Administration’s construction of an ambiguous paragraph in regulations relating to 
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 consumer-directed prescription drug advertising,100 the restrictions placed on trade dress 
protection have also likely contributed to the surge.  In fact, the period between 1999 and 2001 
represented the single largest increase in spending on consumer-directed advertising.101  It cannot 
merely be coincidence that Wal-Mart was decided during this same period.  Under the case’s 
reasoning, pharmaceutical companies must increase product awareness among the consuming 
public before they can gain trade dress protection.  To accomplish this goal, manufacturers are 
forced to increase their budgets for consumer-directed advertising.  This phenomenon can only 
result in heightened spending on consumer-directed advertising in order to receive trade dress 
protection.  In turn, the consuming public will pay higher and higher prices for prescription 
drugs.  To the extent that manufacturers are influenced by this unintended effect of the Shire and 
Wal-Mart holdings, removing the effective prerequisite of increased advertising would lessen the 
financial burden on both manufacturers and, indirectly, on consumers. 
VI.   The Possible Resolution
 To resolve the potential problems created by Shire, the Third Circuit might follow one of 
two approaches.  First, the court could eliminate trade dress protection for pharmaceuticals 
entirely.  This action would alleviate the burden on manufacturers to extensively advertise while 
still satisfying the court’s desire to restrict trade dress protections.  By completely removing 
prescription drug tablets from the realm of trade dress protection, pharmaceutical manufacturers 
would be less inclined to advertise to consumers, since secondary meaning would no longer be a 
path to distinctiveness.  This approach would also allow generic manufacturers to use brand-
name trade dress without fear of prosecution under the Lanham Act, which was the Supreme 
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 Court’s primary concern in Wal-Mart.102  While this option seems to satisfy the main objections 
of the Shire and Wal-Mart courts, it is unlikely that the Third Circuit would take such a drastic 
step.   
 More plausibly, the court could entirely exclude prescription drugs from traditional trade 
dress analysis and create a new approach specifically tailored for the idiosyncrasies of the 
prescription drug industry.  As discussed above, traditional trade dress analysis assumes product 
packaging by which the manufacturer can be identified as the source of the good.  Prescription 
drugs lack such packaging.  To account for these major discrepancies, the court should establish 
new criteria for determining whether a prescription drug tablet’s trade dress has been infringed. 
 A. Distinctiveness  
Distinctiveness should no longer be considered when determining trade dress 
infringement for prescription drug tablets.  Under the patent system, most pharmaceuticals 
companies have a twenty-year period in which they are allowed monopolistic control over their 
drugs.103  As a result, the majority of the consuming public will recognize a drug by its color, 
shape and size of the tablet.  Even if this recognition would fail to qualify as secondary meaning 
under the traditional trade analysis, it would be sufficient to establish distinctiveness under this 
proposed analysis.  Accordingly, the need for pharmaceutical companies to expend excess 
money on advertising to gain secondary meaning, as is required under the traditional system, 
would be eliminated.  The resulting reduction in spending would help to ease the financial 
tension that currently burdens the pharmaceutical market. 
B. Functionality 
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  Functionality should play a less significant role in the determination of trade dress 
infringement.  In fact, this element should only apply where the functionality of the tablet itself is 
sufficient to earn it a design patent.  For example, an improved coating that would allow capsules 
to be swallowed more easily, or could provide more control over the time-release of medication, 
may be sufficient to obtain such a patent.  Liming the applicability of the functionality 
requirement in this fashion would obviate the Third Circuit’s construction in Shire and re-
establish the tests for functionality set out by the Supreme Court in TrafFix.104  “A product is 
functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality 
of the article”; further, a product’s feature is functional if its “exclusive use . . . would put 
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”105  The arguments accepted in 
Shire regarding the functionality of a tablet’s trade dress do not fall within either of these 
definitions espoused in TrafFix.  The Shire court reasoned that no protection should be afforded 
to the tablet’s trade dress because a patient may be more comfortable taking a drug that uses the 
brand-name trade dress.  However, the trade dress adopted for Shire’s tablet was chosen 
arbitrarily; it had nothing to do with the purpose or performance of the drug, or with its 
processing.106  This is the type of reputation-based disadvantage that trade dress law was 
designed to protect.   
 C. Likelihood of Consumer Confusion 
 The final element, likelihood of confusion, would become the central and defining 
element under the new approach.  However, the traditional Lapp factors would have to be 
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 slightly modified to accommodate the unique concerns present in a prescription drug trade dress 
analysis: 
  1. The Similarity of the Prescription Drug Tablets 
This factor would remain relatively intact from the traditional analysis.  Courts would 
have to compare the allegedly infringing tablet with the brand-name tablet to determine the 
degree of similarity between them.  However, they would apply a new standard, inquiring 
whether a reasonable consumer of a particular medication could differentiate between the brand-
name drug tablet and the allegedly infringing generic drug tablet.  A negative finding would be a 
strong indication that the generic manufacturer has infringed the brand-name manufacturer’s 
trade dress.  This factor would serve to encourage generic drug producers to choose distinct 
appearances for their products, thereby minimizing consumer confusion.  Furthermore, 
disallowing identical tablets would lessen the threat of passing off or capsule switching, because 
consumers would be better able to distinguish between various types of pills.107
If trade dresses are similar but not identical then the following subfactors should also be 
considered: 
a. Bioavailability 
 The bioavailability of a drug is the quantity of active ingredients that are released into the 
bloodstream per unit dosage.108  Under the proposed analysis, courts would look to laboratory 
analyses to determine whether the bioavailability of the brand-name drug tablet and the generic 
drug tablet are identical.  The importance of bioavailability cannot be understated because a 
consumer may not realize that a substitution has been made if the trade dress of two types of 
medication is very similar.  A patient’s health could be seriously at risk if two pills appear alike 
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 but have different bioavailability.  No consumer should be subjected to such serious confusion 
and potential harm when taking prescription medication.  Accordingly, under the new 
framework, if a court was to find that the bioavailability of a brand-name tablet and a generic 
product were the same, it would hold that the generic tablet does not confuse consumers.  
Although the significance of a drug’s bioavailability has been greatly reduced by the FDA’s 
current regulations of generic drugs, it should certainly continue to be considered when 
determining the likelihood of consumer confusion.109
 b. Availability of Inactive Ingredients 
 In Shire, the Court recognized, but failed to give adequate weight to, the fact that Barr’s 
generic drug contained the inactive ingredient saccharin.110  Until recently, saccharin was banned 
by the FDA as a suspected carcinogen.111  Many people would still prefer to avoid ingesting the 
substance, regardless of its FDA classification.  For this reason, this factor retains its 
significance.  Thus, a court should take into account the list of inactive ingredients when 
determining whether a tablet’s trade dress is infringing.  If the lists of inactive ingredients were 
found to be identical or equivalent, then the tablet’s trade dress would not confuse consumers. 
2. Intent of the Generic Drug Manufacturer 
Courts should also consider the intent of the generic drug manufacturer in adopting the 
similar or identical trade dress.  As mentioned above, passing off, or capsule switching, is one of 
the reoccurring problems that the courts encounter in the pharmaceutical industry.112  If a court 
was to find that a generic drug manufacturer purposefully copied a brand-name trade dress for 
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 the purpose of passing off or intentionally confusing consumers in any way, then such a finding 
would strongly indicate a likelihood of confusion. 
3. State Law Regarding Disclosure of Generic Substitutions 
 Most states permitting generic substitutions require that purchasers be notified when a 
brand-name drug has been substituted by a generic equivalent.113  Notification under the 
proposed approach would require a consumer to sign a document explaining that such a 
substitution of a brand-name drug has been made.  Pharmacists would be charged with the duty 
of explaining the document to consumers.  As a result of this requirement, generic drugs that 
look similar to their brand-name counterparts would be less likely to cause confusion among 
consumers.  A properly executed notification would indicate to a court that there was no 
likelihood of confusion in a given case.  
VII.   Conclusion 
 Today, brand-name prescription drug manufacturers are unable to protect good will and 
product recognition.  These competitive advantages, which are gained only through years’ worth 
of investment, can be quickly wiped out if a generic drug manufacturer decides to imitate a 
brand-name product.  The Third Circuit’s opinion in Shire has dealt yet another blow to this 
already weak area of protection.  As a result of that decision, brand-name prescription drug 
companies will be required to spend even more money in advertising and marketing to regain the 
protection that was once afforded to them under SK&F.  The manufacturers’ increased operating 
costs will ultimately be passed along to consumers of prescription drugs, as is evidenced by 
United States citizens purchasing their prescription medication in Canada at lower prices.  
Weakening prescription drug trade dress will only further complicate these interrelated problems.  
Although the changes to prescription drug trade dress law proposed in this Note do not cure these 
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 problems, they would mitigate the rising costs of drugs.  The Third Circuit should reevaluate its 
decision in Shire, striving to alleviate the negative effects that its announced policy changes 
could have on the prescription drug market. 
